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 Openbaarheid van bestuur. NGO is in strijd met 
 art. 10 EVRM toegang tot informatie door Hon-
gaarse politie ontzegd. 
 Klager is de Hongaarse non-gouvernementele or-
ganisatie Maygar Helsinki Bizottság, die toeziet op 
de naleving van internationale mensenrechten in 
Hongarije. Klager wilde informatie over de toewij-
zing van pro-deo advocaten, omdat het vermoeden 
leefde dat de Hongaarse politie invloed uitoefende 
op de toewijzing van (vaak steeds dezelfde) advo-
caten. Dit systeem zou de onafhankelijkheid en 
kwaliteit van ambtshalve toegewezen advocaten in 
strafzaken ondermijnen. Klager vroeg in het kader 
van zijn onderzoek de namen van de toegewezen 
advocaten op bij meerdere politiedepartementen, 
alsmede het aantal zaken per advocaat. Twee poli-
tiedepartementen weigerden deze informatie open-
baar te maken, omdat het niet om informatie van 
publiek belang maar om persoonlijke data zou gaan. 
In de daaropvolgende civiele procedure oordeelde 
de Hongaarse rechter in eerste aanleg dat, gezien 
het publieke belang van verplichte rechtsbijstand, 
het belang van het informeren van de samenleving 
prevaleerde boven het belang van privacybescher-
ming. De privacy van de advocaten was bovendien 
niet geschonden, aangezien hun rol publiek was 
vanaf het moment van de aanklacht. Het Hof van 
Beroep en het Hooggerechtshof oordeelden echter 
dat de ambtshalve toegewezen advocaten geen pu-
blieke taak verrichtten. Daarmee was de politie niet 
verplicht om de gevraagde informatie openbaar te 
maken, aangezien de namen van de advocaten en 
de hun toegewezen zaken als persoonlijke data on-
der de bescherming vielen van de nationale priva-
cywetgeving. 
 Klager stelt dat zijn recht op vrijheid van me-
ningsuiting, zoals beschermd door  artikel 10 EVRM, 
geschonden is door de weigering tot openbaarma-
king van de overheidsinformatie. 
 De Grote Kamer van het Hof overweegt onder 
uitgebreide verwijzing naar eigen jurisprudentie, 
internationale rechtsbronnen en nationale open-
baarheidswetgeving in Europa dat het recht op 
overheidsinformatie een inherent element vormt 
van de vrijheid om informatie te ontvangen en te 
verstrekken, zoals verankerd in  artikel 10 EVRM. 
 Het Hof overweegt vervolgens dat het ontzeg-
gen van toegang tot overheidsinformatie het recht 
op vrijheid van meningsuiting kan aantasten als die 
toegang ‘instrumenteel’ is voor de uitoefening van 
dit recht. In hoeverre de ontzegging van toegang 
tot overheidsinformatie een inbreuk op het recht 
op vrijheid van meningsuiting van de verzoeker 
oplevert, hangt af van de omstandigheden van het 
geval. Van een inbreuk op het recht op overheids-
informatie is volgens het Hof sprake wanneer de 
informatie relevant is voor journalistieke activitei-
ten of andere activiteiten die verband houden met 
het publieke debat. Het Hof merkt daarbij op dat het 
recht op overheidsinformatie niet alleen toekomt 
aan journalisten, maar ook aan andere organisaties 
en personen (‘public watchdogs’) wier activiteiten 
essentieel zijn voor het publieke debat in een demo-
cratische samenleving. 
 Het Hof concludeert dat de weigering tot open-
baarmaking van de gevraagde overheidsinformatie 
niet noodzakelijk is in een democratische samenle-
ving en daarmee in strijd is met  artikel 10 EVRM. 
 Maygar Helsinki Bizottság 
 tegen 
 Hongarije 
 The law 
 (…) 
 (v) The Court’s approach to the applicability of 
Article 10 
 149.  Against the above background, the Court 
does not consider that it is prevented from inter-
preting Article 10 § 1 of the Convention as inclu-
ding a right of access to information. 
 150.  The Court is aware of the importance of 
legal certainty in international law and of the ar-
gument that States cannot be expected to imple-
ment an international obligation to which they 
did not agree in the first place. It considers that 
it is in the interest of legal certainty, foreseeabi-
lity and equality before the law that it should not 
depart, without good reason, from precedents 
laid down in previous cases (see  Mamatkulov and 
Askarov , cited above, § 121, and  Chapman v. the 
United Kingdom [GC], no. 27238/95, § 70, ECHR 
2001-I). Since the Convention is first and fore-
most a system for the protection of human rights, 
regard must also be had to the changing conditi-
ons within Contracting States and the Court must 
respond, for example, to any evolving convergen-
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ce as to the standards to be achieved (see  Biao v. 
Denmark  [GC], no. 38590/10, § 131, 24 May 2016). 
 151.  From the survey of the Convention in-
stitutions’ case-law as outlined in paragraphs 
127-132 above, it transpires that there has been a 
perceptible evolution in favour of the recognition, 
under certain conditions, of a right to freedom of 
information as an inherent element of the free-
dom to receive and impart information enshrined 
in Article 10 of the Convention. 
 152.  The Court further observes that this de-
velopment is also reflected in the stance taken 
by international human-rights bodies, linking 
watchdogs’ right of access to information to their 
right to impart information and to the general pu-
blic’s right to receive information and ideas (see 
paragraphs 39-42 and 143 above). 
 153.  Moreover, it is of paramount importance 
that according to the information available to the 
Court nearly all of the thirty-one member States 
of the Council of Europe surveyed have enacted 
legislation on freedom of information. A further 
indicator of common ground in this context is the 
existence of the Convention on Access to Official 
Documents. 
 154.  In the light of these developments and 
in response to the evolving convergence as to 
the standards of human rights protection to be 
achieved, the Court considers that a clarification 
of the  Leander  principles in circumstances such as 
those at issue in the present case is appropriate. 
 155.  The object and purpose of the Conventi-
on, as an instrument for the protection of human 
rights, requires that its provisions must be inter-
preted and applied in a manner which renders 
its rights practical and effective, not theoretical 
and illusory (see  Soering,  cited above, § 87). As is 
clearly illustrated by the Court’s recent case-law 
and the rulings of other human-rights bodies, to 
hold that the right of access to information may 
under no circumstances fall within the ambit of 
Article 10 of the Convention would lead to situ-
ations where the freedom to ‘receive and impart’ 
information is impaired in such a manner and to 
such a degree that it would strike at the very sub-
stance of freedom of expression. For the Court, 
in circumstances where access to information is 
instrumental for the exercise of the applicant’s 
right to receive and impart information, its denial 
may constitute an interference with that right. 
The principle of securing Convention rights in a 
practical and effective manner requires an appli-
cant in such a situation to be able to rely on the 
protection of Article 10 of the Convention. 
 156.  In short, the time has come to clarify the 
classic principles. The Court continues to consider 
that ‘the right to freedom to receive information 
basically prohibits a Government from restricting 
a person from receiving information that others 
wish or may be willing to impart to him.’ More-
over, ‘the right to receive information cannot be 
construed as imposing on a State positive obli-
gations to collect and disseminate information 
of its own motion’. The Court further considers 
that Article 10 does not confer on the individual 
a right of access to information held by a public 
authority nor oblige the Government to impart 
such information to the individual. However, as 
is seen from the above analysis, such a right or 
obligation may arise, firstly, where disclosure of 
the information has been imposed by a judicial 
order which has gained legal force (which is not 
an issue in the present case) and, secondly, in cir-
cumstances where access to the information is 
instrumental for the individual’s exercise of his or 
her right to freedom of expression, in particular 
‘the freedom to receive and impart information’ 
and where its denial constitutes an interference 
with that right. 
 (vi) Threshold criteria for right of access to Sta-
te-held information 
 157.  Whether and to what extent the denial of 
access to information constitutes an interference 
with an applicant’s freedom-of-expression rights 
must be assessed in each individual case and in 
the light of its particular circumstances. In order 
to define further the scope of such a right, the 
Court considers that the recent case-law referred 
to above (see paragraphs 131-32 above) offers va-
luable illustrations of the criteria that ought to be 
relevant. 
 (α) The purpose of the information request 
 158.  First, it must be a prerequisite that the 
purpose of the person in requesting access to 
the information held by a public authority is to 
enable his or her exercise of the freedom to ‘re-
ceive and impart information and ideas’ to others. 
Thus, the Court has placed emphasis on whether 
the gathering of the information was a relevant 
preparatory  step in journalistic activities or in 
other activities creating a forum for, or constitu-
ting an essential element of, public debate (see, 
 mutatis mutandis ,  Társaság,  cited above, § 27-
28; and  Österreichische Vereinigung,  cited above, 
§ 36). 
 159.  In this context, it may be reiterated that 
in the area of press freedom the Court has held 
that, ‘by reason of the ‘duties and responsibilities’ 
inherent in the exercise of the freedom of expres-
sion, the safeguard afforded by Article 10 to jour-
nalists in relation to reporting on issues of gene-
ral interest is subject to the  proviso that they are 
acting in good faith in order to provide accurate 
and reliable information in accordance with the 
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ethics of journalism’ (see  Goodwin v. the United 
Kingdom , 27 March 1996, § 39,  Reports  1996-II; 
 Fressoz and Roire v. France [GC], no. 29183/95, § 54, 
ECHR 1999-I; and Bladet Tromsø and Stensaas v. 
Norway [GC], no. 21980/93, § 65, ECHR 1999-III). 
The same considerations would apply to an NGO 
assuming a social watchdog function (see more 
on this aspect below). 
 Therefore, in order for Article 10 to come 
into play, it must be ascertained whether the 
information sought was in fact necessary for the 
exercise of freedom of expression (see  Roşiianu, 
 cited above, § 63). For the Court, obtaining access 
to information would be considered necessary if 
withholding it would hinder or impair the indi-
vidual’s exercise of his or her right to freedom of 
expression (see  Társaság,  cited above, § 28), inclu-
ding the freedom ‘to receive and impart informa-
tion and ideas’, in a manner consistent with such 
‘duties and responsibilities’ as may follow from 
paragraph 2 of Article 10. 
 (β) The nature of the information sought 
 160.  The Court has previously found that the 
denial of access to information constituted an 
interference with the applicants’ right to receive 
and impart information in situations where the 
data sought was ‘factual information concerning 
the use of electronic surveillance measures’ 
(see  Youth Initiative for Human Rights,  cited above, 
§ 24), ‘nformation about a constitutional com-
plaint’ and ‘on a matter of public importance’ 
(see  Társaság , cited above, § 37-38), ‘original 
documentary sources for legitimate historical 
research’ (see  Kenedi¸  cited above, § 43), and deci-
sions concerning real property transaction com-
missions (see  Österreichische Vereinigung,  cited 
above, § 42), attaching weighty consideration to 
the presence of particular categories of informa-
tion considered to be in the public interest. 
 161.  Maintaining this approach, the Court 
considers that the information, data or docu-
ments to which access is sought must generally 
meet a public-interest test in order to prompt a 
need for disclosure under the Convention. Such a 
need may exist where,  inter alia , disclosure pro-
vides transparency on the manner of conduct of 
public affairs and on matters of interest for soci-
ety as a whole and thereby allows participation in 
public governance by the public at large. 
 162.  The Court has emphasised that the defi-
nition of what might constitute a subject of pu-
blic interest will depend on the circumstances of 
each case. The public interest relates to matters 
which affect the public to such an extent that it 
may legitimately take an interest in them, which 
attract its attention or which concern it to a sig-
nificant degree, especially in that they affect the 
well-being of citizens or the life of the commu-
nity. This is also the case with regard to matters 
which are capable of giving rise to considerable 
controversy, which concern an important social 
issue, or which involve a problem that the public 
would have an interest in being informed about. 
The public interest cannot be reduced to the pu-
blic’s thirst for information about the private life 
of others, or to an audience’s wish for sensatio-
nalism or even voyeurism. In order to ascertain 
whether a publication relates to a subject of ge-
neral importance, it is necessary to assess the pu-
blication as a whole, having regard to the context 
in which it appears (see  Couderc and Hachette Fi-
lipacchi Associés  v. France  [GC], no. 40454/07, § 97 
to 103, ECHR 2015 (extracts), with further refe-
rences). 
 163.  In this connection, the privileged posi-
tion accorded by the Court in its case-law to po-
litical speech and debate on questions of public 
interest is relevant. The rationale for allowing lit-
tle scope under Article 10 § 2 of the Convention 
for restrictions on such expressions (see  Lingens v. 
Austria , 8 July 1986, § 38 and 41, Series A no. 103, 
and  Sürek v. Turkey (no. 1) [GC], no. 26682/95, 
§ 61, ECHR 1999-IV), likewise militates in favour 
of affording a right of access under Article 10 § 1 
to such information held by public authorities. 
 (γ) The role of the applicant 
 164.  A logical consequence of the two criteria 
set out above — one regarding the purpose of the 
information request and the other concerning the 
nature of the information requested — is that the 
particular role of the seeker of the information in 
‘receiving and imparting’ it to the public assumes 
special importance. Thus, in assessing whether 
the respondent State had interfered with the ap-
plicants’ Article 10 rights by denying access to 
certain documents, the Court has previously at-
tached particular weight to the applicant’s role as 
a journalist (see  Roşiianu , cited above, § 61) or as a 
social watchdog or non-governmental organisa-
tion whose activities related to matters of public 
interest (see  Társaság,  § 36;  Österreichische Ver-
einigung , § 35;  Youth Initiative for Human Rights, 
§ 20; and  Guseva , § 41, all cited above). 
 165.  While Article 10 guarantees freedom of 
expression to ‘everyone’, it has been the Court’s 
practice to recognise the essential role played by 
the press in a democratic society (see  De Haes and 
Gijsels v. Belgium , 24 February 1997, § 37,  Reports 
 1997-I) and the special position of journalists in 
this context. It has held that the safeguards to be 
afforded to the press are of particular importance 
(see  Goodwin , cited above, § 39, and Observer 
and  Guardian v. the United Kingdom , 26 Novem-
ber 1991, § 59, Series A no. 216). The vital role of 
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 168.  Thus, the Court considers that an impor-
tant consideration is whether the person seeking 
access to the information in question does so with 
a view to informing the public in the capacity of a 
public ‘watchdog’. This does not mean, however, 
that a right of access to information ought to ap-
ply exclusively to NGOs and the press. It reiterates 
that a high level of protection also extends to 
academic researchers (see  Başkaya and Okçuoğlu 
v. Turkey [GC], nos. 23536/94 and 24408/94, § 61-
67, ECHR 1999-IV;  Kenedi , cited above, § 42; and 
 Gillberg , cited above, § 93) and authors of litera-
ture on matters of public concern (see  Chauvy 
and Others v. France , no. 64915/01, § 68, ECHR 
2004-VI, and  Lindon, Otchakovsky-Laurens and 
July v. France  [GC], nos. 21279/02 and 36448/02, 
§ 48, ECHR 2007-IV). The Court would also note 
that given the important role played by the Inter-
net in enhancing the public’s access to news and 
facilitating the dissemination of information (see 
 Delfi AS v. Estonia  [GC], no. 64569/09, § 133, ECHR 
2015), the function of bloggers and popular users 
of the social media may be also assimilated to 
that of ‘public watchdogs’ in so far as the protec-
tion afforded by Article 10 is concerned. 
 (δ) Ready and available information 
 169.  In reaching its conclusion that the re-
fusal of access was in breach of Article 10, the 
Court has previously had regard to the fact that 
the information sought was ‘ready and available’ 
and did not necessitate the collection of any data 
by the Government (see  Társaság,  cited above, 
§ 36, and,  a contrario ,  Weber v. Germany (dec.), 
no. 70287/11, § 26, 6 January 2015). On the other 
hand, the Court dismissed a domestic authority’s 
reliance on the anticipated difficulty of gathering 
information as a ground for its refusal to provide 
the applicant with documents, where such diffi-
culty was generated by the authority’s own prac-
tice (see  Österreichische Vereinigung,  cited above, 
§ 46). 
 170.  In the light of the above-mentioned 
case-law, and bearing in mind also the wording 
of Article 10 § 1 (namely, the words ‘without in-
terference by public authority’), the Court is of 
the view that the fact that the information reque-
sted is ready and available ought to constitute an 
important criterion in the overall assessment of 
whether a refusal to provide the information can 
be regarded as an ‘interference’ with the freedom 
to ‘receive and impart information’ as protected 
by that provision. 
 (vii) Application of those criteria to the present 
case 
 171.  The applicant organisation argued that it 
had a right under Article 10 to obtain access to the 
the media in facilitating and fostering the public’s 
right to receive and impart information and ideas 
has been repeatedly recognised by the Court, as 
follows: 
 “The duty of the press is to impart — in a 
manner consistent with its obligations and 
responsibilities — information and ideas on 
all matters of public interest. Not only does 
it have the task of imparting such informa-
tion and ideas: the public also has a right to 
receive them. Were it otherwise, the press 
would be unable to play its vital role of ‘public 
watchdog’ (see Bladet Tromsø and Stensaas v. 
Norway [GC], no. 21980/93, § 59 and 62, ECHR 
1999-III).” 
 166.  The Court has also acknowledged that 
the function of creating various platforms for pu-
blic debate is not limited to the press but may also 
be exercised by, among others, non-governmen-
tal organisations, whose activities are an essential 
element of informed public debate. The Court has 
accepted that when an NGO draws attention to 
matters of public interest, it is exercising a public 
watchdog role of similar importance to that of the 
press (see  Animal Defenders International v. the 
United Kingdom [GC], no. 48876/08, § 103, ECHR 
2013 (extracts)) and may be characterised as a so-
cial ‘watchdog’ warranting similar protection un-
der the Convention as that afforded to the press 
(ibid.;  Társaság , cited above, § 27; and  Youth Ini-
tiative for Human Rights , cited above, § 20). It has 
recognised that civil society makes an important 
contribution to the discussion of public affairs 
(see, for instance,  Steel and Morris v. the United 
Kingdom , no. 68416/01, § 89, ECHR 2005-II; and 
 Társaság , § 38, cited above). 
 167.  The manner in which public watchdogs 
carry out their activities may have a significant 
impact on the proper functioning of a democra-
tic society. It is in the interest of democratic so-
ciety to enable the press to exercise its vital role 
of ‘public watchdog’ in imparting information on 
matters of public concern (see  Bladet Tromsø and 
Stensaas , cited above, § 59), just as it is to enable 
NGOs scrutinising the State to do the same thing. 
Given that accurate information is a tool of their 
trade, it will often be necessary for persons and 
organisations exercising watchdog functions to 
gain access to information in order to perform 
their role of reporting on matters of public inte-
rest. Obstacles created in order to hinder access 
to information may result in those working in the 
media or related fields no longer being able to as-
sume their ‘watchdog’ role effectively, and their 
ability to provide accurate and reliable informati-
on may be adversely affected (see  Társaság,  cited 
above, § 38). 
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concerned the applicant was unable to contribute 
to a public debate drawing on accurate and reli-
able information. The information was therefore 
‘necessary’ within the meaning referred to in pa-
ragraph 159 above for the applicant’s exercise of 
its right to freedom of expression. 
 176.  As regards the nature of the information, 
the Court observes that the domestic authorities 
made no assessment whatsoever of the poten-
tial public-interest character of the information 
sought and were concerned only with the sta-
tus of public defenders from the perspective of 
the Data Act. The latter allowed for very limited 
exceptions to the general rule of non-disclosure 
of personal data. Once the domestic authorities 
had established that public defenders did not fall 
within the category of ‘other persons performing 
public duties’, which was the only relevant excep-
tion in the particular context, they were preven-
ted from examining the potential public-interest 
nature of the information. 
 177.  The Court notes that this approach de-
prived the public-interest justification relied 
on by the applicant NGO of any relevance. In 
the Court’s view, however, the information on 
the appointment of public defenders was of an 
eminently public-interest nature, irrespective of 
whether public defenders could be qualified as 
‘other persons performing public duties’ under 
the relevant national law. 
 178.  As to the role of the applicant NGO, it is 
common ground between the parties that the 
present case concerns a well-established public-
interest organisation committed to the dissemi-
nation of information on issues of human rights 
and the rule of law. Its professional stance on the 
matters it deals with and its outreach to the broa-
der public have not been called into question. The 
Court sees no reason to doubt that the survey 
in question contained information of the kind 
which the applicant NGO undertook to impart to 
the public and which the public had a right to re-
ceive. The Court is further satisfied that it was ne-
cessary for the applicant’s fulfilment of this task 
to have access to the requested information. 
 179.  Lastly, the Court notes that the informa-
tion was ready and available; and it has not been 
argued before the Court that its disclosure would 
have been particularly burdensome for the aut-
horities (compare and contrast  Weber , cited abo-
ve). 
 (viii) Conclusion 
 180.  In sum, the information sought by the 
applicant NGO from the relevant police depart-
ments was necessary for the completion of the 
survey on the functioning of the public defenders’ 
scheme being conducted by it in its capacity as a 
information requested, since the purpose of the 
request had been to complete a survey in support 
of proposals for reform of the public defenders 
scheme and to inform the public on a matter of 
general interest (see paragraph 95 above). The 
Government maintained however that the actual 
purpose of the survey was to discredit the exis-
ting system of public defenders (see paragraph 85 
above). 
 172.  The Court is satisfied that the applicant 
NGO wished to exercise the right to impart infor-
mation on a matter of public interest and sought 
access to information to that end. 
 173.  The Court also notes the Government’s 
submission that the information sought, specifi-
cally, the names of lawyers who had been assig-
ned as public defence counsel, was by no means 
necessary for reaching conclusions and publi-
shing findings about the efficiency of the public 
defender system. Consequently, in their view, 
the non-disclosure of those personal data did not 
hinder the applicant NGO’s participation in a pu-
blic debate (see paragraph 77 above). They also 
challenged the usefulness of the nominative in-
formation, arguing that anonymously processed 
extracts from the files in question would have 
met the applicant NGO’s needs (see paragraph 84 
above). 
 174.  The applicant NGO submitted that the 
names of public defenders and the number of 
appointments given to each one was information 
that was required in order to investigate and de-
termine any malfunctioning in the system (see 
paragraph 96 above). The applicant NGO also ar-
gued that the core aspect of its publication on the 
efficiency of the public defender system was the 
allegedly disparate distribution of appointments. 
 175.  In the Court’s view, the information re-
quested by the applicant NGO from the police de-
partments was, undisputedly, within the subject 
area of its research. In order to be able to support 
its arguments, the applicant wished to collect no-
minative information on the individual lawyers 
in order to demonstrate any recurrent appoint-
ment patterns. Had the applicant NGO limited its 
inquiry to anonymised information, as suggested 
by the Government, it would in all likelihood 
have been unable to produce verifiable results 
in support of its criticism of the existing scheme. 
Moreover, with regard to the completeness or 
statistical significance of the information in dis-
pute, the Court notes that the aim of the data re-
quest was to cover the entire country, including 
all the County Police Departments. The refusal by 
two departments to provide information repre-
sented an obstacle to producing and publishing 
a fully comprehensive survey. Thus, it can reaso-
nably be concluded that without the information 
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horities,  Rekvényi v. Hungary [GC], no. 25390/94, 
§ 35, ECHR 1999-III). Nor is it for the Court to ex-
press a view on the appropriateness of the me-
thods chosen by the legislature of a respondent 
State to regulate a given field. Its task is confined 
to determining whether the methods adopted 
and the effects they entail are in conformity with 
the Convention (see  Gorzelik and Others v. Poland 
[GC], no. 44158/98, § 67, ECHR 2004-I). 
 185.  The Court notes that the Supreme Court 
examined in detail the legal status of  ex officio 
appointed defence counsel and the applicant 
NGO’s arguments as to their duties to ensure the 
right to defence and that it found that they were 
not ‘other persons exercising public duties’. The 
Supreme Court’s interpretation was in line with 
the Recommendation of the Parliamentary Com-
missioner for Data Protection, published in 2006 
(see paragraph 34 above). The Court sees no rea-
son to question the Supreme Court’s interpreta-
tion that public defenders could not be regarded 
as ‘other persons exercising public duties’ and 
that section 19(4) of the Data Act provided a le-
gal basis for the impugned denial of access. The 
interference was thus ‘prescribed by law’ within 
the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 
10. 
 (ii) Legitimate aim 
 186.  The Court observes that it was not in dis-
pute between the parties that the restriction on 
the applicant NGO’s freedom of expression pur-
sued the legitimate aim of protecting the rights of 
others, and it sees no reason to hold otherwise. 
 (iii) Necessary in a democratic society 
 187.  The fundamental principles concerning 
the question whether an interference with free-
dom of expression is ‘necessary in a democratic 
society’ are well established in the Court’s case-
law and have been summarised as follows (see, 
among other authorities,  Hertel v. Switzerland , 
25 August 1998, § 46, Reports 1998-VI;  Steel and 
Morris , cited above, § 87;  Mouvement raëlien suis-
se v. Switzerland [GC], no. 16354/06, § 48, ECHR 
2012 (extracts);  Animal Defenders International , 
cited above, § 100; and most recently  Delfi,  cited 
above, § 131): 
 “(i)  Freedom of expression constitutes 
one of the essential foundations of a democra-
tic society and one of the basic conditions for 
its progress and for each individual’s self-ful-
filment. Subject to paragraph 2 of Article 10, it 
is applicable not only to ‘information’ or ‘ideas’ 
that are favourably received or regarded as in-
offensive or as a matter of indifference, but 
also to those that offend, shock or disturb. 
Such are the demands of pluralism, tolerance 
non-governmental human-rights organisation, in 
order to contribute to discussion on an issue of 
obvious public interest. By denying it access to 
the requested information, which was ready and 
available, the domestic authorities impaired the 
applicant NGO’s exercise of its freedom to receive 
and impart information, in a manner striking at 
the very substance of its Article 10 rights. There 
has therefore been an interference with a right 
protected by this provision, which is applicable 
to the present case. The Government’s objection 
that the applicant’s complaint is incompatible  ra-
tione materiae  must therefore be dismissed. 
 (b) Whether the interference was justified 
 181.  In order to be justified, an interference 
with the applicant NGO’s right to freedom of 
expression must be ‘prescribed by law’, pursue 
one or more of the legitimate aims mentioned in 
paragraph 2 of Article 10, and be ‘necessary in a 
democratic society’. 
 (i) Lawfulness 
 182.  The Court observes that the parties dis-
agreed as to whether the interference with the 
applicant NGO’s freedom of expression was ‘pres-
cribed by law’. The applicant organisation relied 
on section 19(4) of the Data Act and argued that it 
expressly provided for the disclosure of personal 
data of ‘other persons performing public duties’, 
whereas there was no provision which prohibited 
the disclosure of the names of  ex officio  appointed 
defence counsel. The Government, for their part, 
referred to the opinion of the Data Protection 
Commissioner and the judgments of the domes-
tic courts interpreting section 19(4) of the Data 
Act to the effect that  ex officio appointed defence 
counsel were not ‘other persons performing pu-
blic duties’, and thus their personal data could 
not be disclosed. In their view, the Court ought 
to proceed from the facts as established and the 
law as applied and interpreted by the domestic 
courts. 
 183.  The Court observes that the difference in 
the parties’ opinions as regards the applicable law 
originates in their diverging views on the issue 
of how public defenders are to be characterised 
in the domestic law. According to the applicant 
NGO, they should be classified as ‘other persons 
exercising public duties’, whereas the Govern-
ment argued that they were to be seen as private 
persons, including with regard to their activities 
carried out when appointed by public authorities. 
 184.  As the Court has held on numerous oc-
casions, it is not its task to take the place of the 
domestic courts and it was primarily for the na-
tional authorities, notably the courts, to interpret 
and apply domestic law (see, among many aut-
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 189.  In this regard, the applicant NGO main-
tained that there was no justification for the 
non-disclosure of information concerning the ap-
pointment of public defenders who are retained 
by public authorities within the framework of 
a State-funded scheme, even in the face of any 
privacy considerations advanced by the Govern-
ment. 
 190.  For their part, the Government argued 
that the broad interpretation of the notion ‘other 
persons performing public duties’, as suggested 
by the applicant NGO, would be liable to nullify 
any protection of the private life of public defen-
ders (see paragraph 83 above). 
 191.  The Court reiterates that the disclosure 
of information relating to an individual’s pri-
vate life comes within the scope of Article 8 § 1 
(see  Leander , cited above, § 48). It points out in 
this connection that the concept of ‘private life’ is 
a broad term not susceptible to exhaustive defini-
tion (see  S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], 
nos. 30562/04 and 30566/04, § 66, ECHR 2008, 
and  Pretty v. the United Kingdom , no. 2346/02, 
§ 61, ECHR 2002-III). It covers the physical and 
psychological integrity of a person. It can there-
fore embrace multiple aspects of a person’s phy-
sical and social identity. Elements such as, for 
example, gender identification, name and sexual 
orientation and sexual life fall within the personal 
sphere protected by Article 8 (see  S. and Marper , 
cited above, § 66, and  Pretty , cited above, § 61, 
with further references). Private life may also in-
clude activities of a professional or business na-
ture (see  Niemietz v. Germany,  16 December 1992, 
§ 29, Series A no. 251-B). The Court has also held 
that there is a zone of interaction of a person with 
others, even in a public context, which may fall 
within the scope of ‘private life’ (see  Couderc and 
Hachette Filipacchi Associés, cited above, § 83). 
 192.  In the context of personal data, the Court 
has previously referred to the Council of Europe’s 
Convention of 28 January 1981 for the Protection 
of Individuals with regard to Automatic Proces-
sing of Personal Data (see paragraph 54 above), 
the purpose of which is ‘to secure ... for every in-
dividual ... respect for his rights and fundamental 
freedoms, and in particular his right to privacy 
with regard to automatic processing of personal 
data relating to him’ (Article 1). Personal data 
are defined in Article 2 as ‘any information re-
lating to an identified or identifiable individual’ 
(see  Amann v. Switzerland [GC], no. 27798/95, 
§ 65, ECHR 2000-II). It has identified examples 
of personal data relating to the most intimate 
and personal aspects of an individual, such as 
health status (see  Z v. Finland , 25 February 1997, 
§ 96-97,  Reports  1997-I, concerning HIV-positive 
status, and  M.S. v. Sweden , 27 August 1997, § 47, 
and broadmindedness without which there 
is no ‘democratic society’. As set forth in Ar-
ticle 10, this freedom is subject to exceptions, 
which... must, however, be construed strictly, 
and the need for any restrictions must be es-
tablished convincingly... 
 (ii)  The adjective ‘necessary’, within the 
meaning of Article 10 § 2, implies the existen-
ce of a ‘pressing social need’. The Contracting 
States have a certain margin of appreciation 
in assessing whether such a need exists, but 
it goes hand in hand with European supervi-
sion, embracing both the legislation and the 
decisions applying it, even those given by an 
independent court. The Court is therefore em-
powered to give the final ruling on whether 
a ‘restriction’ is reconcilable with freedom of 
expression as protected by Article 10. 
 (iii)  The Court’s task, in exercising its su-
pervisory jurisdiction, is not to take the place 
of the competent national authorities but 
rather to review under Article 10 the decisi-
ons they delivered pursuant to their power 
of appreciation. This does not mean that the 
supervision is limited to ascertaining whether 
the respondent State exercised its discretion 
reasonably, carefully and in good faith; what 
the Court has to do is to look at the interfe-
rence complained of in the light of the case as 
a whole and determine whether it was ‘pro-
portionate to the legitimate aim pursued’ and 
whether the reasons adduced by the national 
authorities to justify it are ‘relevant and suf-
ficient’... In doing so, the Court has to satisfy 
itself that the national authorities applied 
standards which were in conformity with the 
principles embodied in Article 10 and, more-
over, that they relied on an acceptable assess-
ment of the relevant facts ...” 
 188.  The Court observes that the central is-
sue underlying the applicant NGO’s grievance is 
that the information sought was characterised 
by the authorities as personal data not subject to 
disclosure. This was so because, under Hungarian 
law, the concept of personal data encompassed 
any information that could identify an individual. 
Such information was not susceptible to disclo-
sure, unless this possibility was expressly provi-
ded for by law, or the information was related to 
the performance of municipal or governmental 
(State) functions or was related to other persons 
performing public duties. Since the Supreme 
Court’s ruling excluded public defenders from 
the category of ‘other persons performing public 
duties’, there was no legal possibility open to the 
applicant NGO to argue that disclosure of the in-
formation was necessary for the discharge of its 
watchdog role. 
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as information contained in lists of legal-aid pro-
viders, court hearing schedules and public court 
hearings, although it is clear that it was not col-
lated at the moment of the survey. 
 196.  Against this background, the interests 
invoked by the Government with reference 
to Article 8 of the Convention are not of such a 
nature and degree as could warrant engaging 
the application of this provision and bringing it 
into play in a balancing exercise against the ap-
plicant NGO’s right as protected by paragraph 1 
of Article 10 (compare and contrast  Couderc and 
Hachette Filipacchi Associés,  § 91;  Axel Springer AG , 
§ 87, both cited above;  Von Hannover v. Germany 
(no. 2)  [GC], nos. 40660/08 and 60641/08, § 106, 
ECHR 2012, and  Perinçek v. Switzerland  [GC], 
no. 27510/08, § 227-28, ECHR 2015 (extracts)). 
Nonetheless, Article 10 does not guarantee an 
unlimited freedom of expression; and as already 
found in paragraph 188 above, the protection of 
the private interests of public defenders consti-
tutes a legitimate aim permitting a restriction on 
freedom of expression under paragraph 2 of that 
provision. Thus, the salient question is whether 
the means used to protect those interests were 
proportionate to the aim sought to be achieved. 
 197.  The Court notes that the subject mat-
ter of the survey concerned the efficiency of the 
public defenders system (see paragraphs 15-16 
above). This issue was closely related to the right 
to a fair hearing, a fundamental right in Hunga-
rian law (see paragraph 33 above) and a right of 
paramount importance under the Convention. 
Indeed, any criticism or suggested improvement 
to a service so directly connected to fair-trial 
rights must be seen as a subject of legitimate pu-
blic concern. In its intended survey, the applicant 
NGO wished to explore its theory that the pattern 
of recurrent appointments of the same lawyers 
was dysfunctional, casting doubt on the adequacy 
of the scheme. The contention that the legal-aid 
scheme might be prejudiced as such because 
public defenders were systematically selected by 
the police from the same pool of lawyers — and 
were then unlikely to challenge police investi-
gations in order not to be overlooked for further 
appointments — does indeed raise a legitimate 
concern. The potential repercussions of police-
appointed lawyers on defence rights have already 
been acknowledged by the Court in the  Martin 
case (cited above). The issue under scrutiny thus 
going to the very essence of a Convention right, 
the Court is satisfied that the applicant NGO in-
tended to contribute to a debate on a matter of 
public interest (see paragraphs 164-65 above). 
The refusal to grant the request effectively im-
paired the applicant NGO’s contribution to a pu-
blic debate on a matter of general interest. 
 Reports  1997-IV, concerning records on abortion), 
attitude to religion (see, in the context of free-
dom of religion,  Sinan Işık v. Turkey , no. 21924/05, 
§ 42-53, ECHR 2010), and sexual orientation (see 
 Lustig-Prean and Beckett v. the United Kingdom , 
nos. 31417/96 and 32377/96, § 82, 27 September 
1999), finding that such categories of data con-
stituted particular elements of private life falling 
within the scope of the protection of Article 8 of 
the Convention. 
 193.  In determining whether the personal 
information retained by the authorities related 
to the relevant public defenders’ enjoyment of 
their right to respect for private life, the Court will 
have due regard to the specific context (see  S. and 
Marper,  cited above, § 67). There are a number of 
elements which are relevant to the assessment 
of whether a person’s private life is concerned by 
measures effected outside that person’s home or 
private premises. Since there are occasions when 
people knowingly or intentionally involve them-
selves in activities which are or may be recorded 
or reported in a public manner, a person’s reaso-
nable expectations as to privacy may be a signifi-
cant, although not necessarily conclusive, factor 
in this assessment (see  P.G. and J.H. v. the United 
Kingdom , no. 44787/98, § 57, ECHR 2001-IX). 
 194.  In the present case, the information 
requested consisted of the names of public de-
fenders and the number of times they had been 
appointed to act as counsel in certain jurisdicti-
ons. For the Court, the request for these names, 
although they constituted personal data, related 
predominantly to the conduct of professional 
activities in the context of public proceedings. In 
this sense, public defenders’ professional activi-
ties cannot be considered to be a private matter. 
Moreover, the information sought did not relate 
to the public defenders’ actions or decisions in 
connection with the carrying out of their tasks as 
legal representatives or consultations with their 
clients. The Government have not demonstrated 
that disclosure of the information requested for 
the specific purposes of the applicant’s inquiry 
could have affected the public defenders’ enjoy-
ment of their right to respect for private life wit-
hin the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention. 
 195.  The Court also finds that the disclosure of 
public defenders’ names and the number of their 
respective appointments would not have subjec-
ted them to exposure to a degree surpassing that 
which they could possibly have foreseen when 
registering as public defenders (compare and 
contrast  Peck v. the United Kingdom , no. 44647/98, 
§ 62, ECHR 2003-I). There is no reason to assume 
that information about the names of public de-
fenders and their appointments could not be 
known to the public through other means, such 
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 (b)  that from the expiry of the above-men-
tioned three months until settlement simple in-
terest shall be payable on the above amounts at 
a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the 
European Central Bank during the default period 
plus three percentage points. 
 Noot 
 1. Deze uitspraak van de Grote Kamer is van 
groot belang, nu deze een erkenning inhoudt van 
de bescherming van het recht om informatie van 
de overheid te ontvangen op grond van  art. 10 
EVRM. Eerdere uitspraken wezen al enigszins in 
deze richting (EHRM 14 april 2009,  NJ 2010/209 , 
m.nt. Dommering ( Társagág t. Hongarije )), maar 
pas in dit standaardarrest komt het Hof met een 
uitgebreide motivering tot een duidelijke erken-
ning. Daarmee krijgt de nationale wetgeving op 
het terrein van de openbaarheid van bestuur voor 
een deel ook een verankering in het EVRM, al-
hoewel de Afdeling daarop al enigszins een voor-
schot leek te nemen (ABRvS 19 januari 2011,  AB 
2011/148 , m.nt. Daalder). Dat is voor Nederland 
relevant in het kader van de rechtspraktijk onder 
de Wet openbaarheid van bestuur (Wob), maar 
evenzeer bij de discussie over de beoogde opvol-
ger daarvan; de Wet open overheid ( Woo ), die is 
aangenomen door de Tweede Kamer maar in de 
Eerste Kamer (stil)ligt in verband met diverse las-
tendrukonderzoeken. 
 2. Het is echter niet zo dat het recht van 
een ieder op het ontvangen van overheidsinfor-
matie nu wordt erkend onder  art. 10 EVRM en in 
die zin was de erkenning door de Afdeling in de 
hiervoor genoemde uitspraak misschien te ruim 
( E.J. Daalder ,  Handboek openbaarheid van bestuur , 
Den Haag 2015, p. 26-34, die er terecht op wijst 
dat het recht op overheidsinformatie ook uit  art. 
2 ,  8 of  13 EVRM kan voortvloeien). Deze erken-
ning is namelijk alleen aan de orde indien het ver-
krijgen van de informatie instrumenteel is in het 
kader van de uitoefening van de vrijheid van me-
ningsuiting als bedoeld in dit verdragsartikel. Op 
basis daarvan geeft het Hof een aantal gezichts-
punten mee waarmee kan worden bepaald of 
een bepaald verzoek om overheidsinformatie al 
dan niet bescherming heeft onder art. 10 EVRM. 
Gewezen wordt in r.o. 158 e.v. op a) het doel van 
het informatieverzoek (journalistieke doelen, 
bijdragen tot maatschappelijk debat etc. vinden 
bescherming), b) de aard van de gevraagde infor-
matie (deze moet zien op een algemeen belang 
en niet louter van belang zijn om een inkijkje in 
de privélevens van personen te krijgen zonder dat 
daarmee een breder belang wordt gediend), c) de 
rol van de verzoeker (het moet gaan om ‘public 
watchdogs’ zoals journalisten en NGO’s) en d) 
 198.  Having regard to the considerations in 
paragraphs 194-196, the Court does not find that 
the privacy rights of the public defenders would 
have been negatively affected had the applicant 
NGO’s request for the information been granted. 
Although the information request admittedly 
concerned personal data, it did not involve in-
formation outside the public domain. As already 
mentioned above, it consisted only of informa-
tion of a statistical nature about the number of 
times the individuals in question had been ap-
pointed to represent defendants in public cri-
minal proceedings within the framework of the 
publicly funded national legal-aid scheme. 
 199.  The relevant Hungarian law, as inter-
preted by the competent domestic courts, exclu-
ded any meaningful assessment of the applicant’s 
freedom-of-expression rights under Article 10 of 
the Convention, in a situation where any restricti-
ons on the applicant NGO’s proposed publication 
— which was intended to contribute to a debate 
on a matter of general interest — would have re-
quired the utmost scrutiny. 
 200.  In the light of the above, the Court con-
siders that the arguments advanced by the Go-
vernment, although relevant, were not sufficient 
to show that the interference complained of was 
‘necessary in a democratic society’. In particular, 
the Court considers that, notwithstanding the 
respondent State’s margin of appreciation, there 
was not a reasonable relationship of proportiona-
lity between the measure complained of and the 
legitimate aim pursued. 
 There has accordingly been a violation of Arti-
cle 10 of the Convention. (…) 
 For these reasons, the Court 
 1.  Joins the Government’s preliminary objection 
to the merits and  dismisses it, by a majority; 
 2.  Declares , by a majority, the application admis-
sible; 
 3.  Holds , by fifteen votes to two, that there has 
been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention; 
 4.  Holds , by fifteen votes to two, 
 (a)  that the respondent State is to pay the 
applicant NGO, within three months, the follo-
wing amounts, to be converted into the currency 
of the respondent State at the rate applicable at 
the date of settlement: 
 (i)  € 215 (two hundred and fifteen euros), 
plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of 
pecuniary damage; 
 (ii)  € 8,875 (eight thousand eight hundred 
and seventy-five euros), plus any tax that may 
be chargeable to the applicant NGO, in respect of 
costs and expenses; 
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terlijke organen, de Raad voor de Rechtspraak, de 
Raad van State en zijn afdelingen, de Algemene 
Rekenkamer en de Nationale ombudsman (zie 
 art. 1:1 lid 2 Awb). Het overheidsbegrip onder art. 
10 EVRM kent dergelijke beperkingen echter niet. 
Dat impliceert dat art. 10 EVRM hier een belang-
rijke aanvullende openbaarheidsrol zou kunnen 
vervullen. Ook hier geldt dat de Woo ruimharti-
ger is, daaronder vallen ook de Staten-Generaal 
en de Raad van State (zij het met uitzondering 
van de Afdeling bestuursrechtspraak), maar ook 
daar is het bereik beperkter dan dat van art. 10 
EVRM. In ieder geval impliceert dit dat een ver-
zoek om informatie niet meer zonder nadere 
belangenafweging en motivering kan worden 
geweigerd onder verwijzing naar de bepalingen 
waaruit volgt dat bepaalde overheidsorganisaties 
niet onder de Wob (of in de toekomst mogelijk de 
Woo) vallen (vgl. M.M. Groothuis,  Openbaarheid 
van overheidsinformatie , Preadvies Vereniging 
voor de vergelijkende studie van het recht van 
België en Nederland, Den Haag 2014, p. 69-103). 
Tegelijk valt te verwachten dat er juist ten aan-
zien van dit soort organisaties vaker een recht-
vaardigingsgrond aanwezig is voor een beperking 
van de openbaarheid. Maar een categorische wei-
gering kan niet meer aan de orde zijn. 
 6. Al met al een uitspraak die de nodige stof 
aanreikt ter overdenking van de vraag hoe een 
goed systeem van openbaarheid van overheidsin-
formatie in te richten. Dat is wel een verademing 
na alle negatieve jurisprudentie en wetgeving ter 
bestrijding van misbruik van de Wob die de afge-
lopen jaren de boventoon voerden. 
 T. Barkhuysen en M.L. van Emmerik 
 AB 2017/2 
 EUROPEES HOF VOOR DE RECHTEN VAN DE 
MENS 
 16 juni 2015 , nr. 75292/10 
 (J. Casadevall, L. López Guerra, J. Šikuta, K. Pardalos, 
J. Silvis, V. Griţco, I.A. Motoc) 
 m.nt. T. Barkhuysen en M.L. van Emmerik 
 Art. 8, 13 EVRM 
 H&I 2015/268 
 ECLI:NL:XX:2015:280 
 Uitwisseling fiscale gegevens. Effectieve rechts-
bescherming voor nationale instantie. Privacy. 
 Art. 13 juncto  8 EVRM vereist geen voorafgaan-
de kennisgeving van deze uitwisseling. 
 Klager is het in Nederland gevestigde bedrijf Othy-
mia Investments BV. Op verzoek van de Spaanse 
de beschikbaarheid van de informatie ofwel de 
vraag of er veel werk nodig is om de informatie 
te verzamelen (dit kan een rol spelen in de belan-
genafweging onder  art. 10 lid 2 EVRM of een be-
perking van het recht al dan niet gerechtvaardigd 
is). 
 3. Voor de huidige praktijk onder de Wob 
betekent dit dat als het recht van  art. 10 EVRM 
toepasselijk is de absolute weigeringsgronden 
van  art. 10 Wob niet zonder meer (zonder nadere 
belangenafweging en motivering) mogen wor-
den toegepast. De relatieve weigeringsgronden 
van art. 10 en  11 Wob zullen waar nodig verdrags-
conform moeten worden ingevuld. Bijzonder 
daarbij is dat het doel waarmee om informatie 
wordt gevraagd daarmee dus een expliciete rol 
moet gaan spelen in de belangenafweging als-
mede wie de verzoeker is. De systematiek van de 
Wob gaat er daarentegen vanuit dat het doel van 
het verzoek en de persoon van de verzoeker niet 
relevant zijn en dat steeds in abstracto het belang 
van algemene openbaarheid moet worden afge-
wogen tegen een belang dat samenhangt met 
een weigeringsgrond. Tegelijk lijkt de soep hier 
niet heel heet gegeten te worden als het tenmin-
ste gaat om de relatieve weigeringsgronden. Het 
belang van openbaarheid heeft daar immers al 
een plaats in de wettelijk voorgeschreven belan-
genafweging. Toch kan ook hier wel sturing aan 
de orde zijn wanneer de Europese jurisprudentie 
zich ontwikkelt. 
 4. Verder is de uitspraak in zekere zin ook 
een steun in de rug voor de  Woo , die als gezegd 
nu in de Eerste Kamer ligt. In lijn met de uitspraak 
voorziet de Woo immers in minder absolute 
weigeringsgronden. Verder kent de Woo in art. 
5.6 de mogelijkheid van openbaarmaking van 
niet-openbare informatie vanwege klemmende 
redenen op voorwaarde dat daarmee niet een 
geheimhoudingsplicht wordt geschonden. In art. 
5.7 krijgen journalisten en wetenschappers zelfs 
een bijzondere positie in die zin dat zij (onder 
voorwaarden) toegang kunnen krijgen tot niet 
openbare informatie indien dat nodig is vanwege 
wetenschappelijke of journalistieke doeleinden. 
Daarmee kan de Woo gemakkelijker voldoen aan 
de Straatsbursge eisen dan de huidige Wob. 
 5. Ten slotte is nog een interessante vraag 
of  art. 10 EVRM ziet op een ruimer bereik dan de 
Wob (en wellicht zelfs de  Woo ) als het gaat om 
de vraag welke documenten kunnen worden 
opgevraagd. De Wob is van toepassing op be-
stuursorganen in de zin van de Awb en organisa-
ties die onder de verantwoordelijk van dergelijke 
organen werkzaam zijn ( art. 1a lid 1 juncto  3 lid 
1 Wob). Dit betekent dat bepaalde organen uit-
gezonderd zijn van toepassing van de Wob. Denk 
daarbij onder meer aan de Staten-Generaal, rech-
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